Key Points
- Research suggests John M. Doris’s situationist approach emphasizes situational factors over stable character traits in moral behavior, challenging traditional virtue ethics.
- It seems likely that Doris’s view, based on psychological studies like Milgram’s, shows behavior varies more with context than character, but character still plays a role.
- The evidence leans toward situationism highlighting the need for better situational design to improve morality, though it’s debated whether it fully dismisses character.
Direct Answer
John M. Doris’s situationist approach to morality argues that our moral actions are more influenced by the situation we’re in, rather than by fixed character traits like honesty or bravery. This challenges the traditional view that people have stable moral characters that guide their behavior consistently. Instead, Doris points to psychological studies, like the Milgram experiment where people followed orders to administer shocks, showing how context can override personal morals. It’s a compelling idea, backed by evidence, but it doesn’t mean character doesn’t matter at all—it’s more about how situations can sway us, especially in high-pressure moments.
Why It Matters
This approach is interesting because it suggests we should focus on designing better environments to encourage good behavior, like adding oversight at work to reduce dishonesty, rather than just hoping for virtuous people. It’s not just about who you are, but where you are—think how a deadline rush might make someone skip helping a colleague, or how a crowd’s mood at a protest can change actions.
This approach is interesting because it suggests we should focus on designing better environments to encourage good behavior, like adding oversight at work to reduce dishonesty, rather than just hoping for virtuous people. It’s not just about who you are, but where you are—think how a deadline rush might make someone skip helping a colleague, or how a crowd’s mood at a protest can change actions.
Unexpected Detail
What’s unexpected is how small changes, like finding a dime, can make someone more likely to help others, showing how tiny situational shifts can have big moral impacts, as seen in studies like Isen and Levin’s “dime in the phone booth” experiment (Situationism and Virtue Ethics).
What’s unexpected is how small changes, like finding a dime, can make someone more likely to help others, showing how tiny situational shifts can have big moral impacts, as seen in studies like Isen and Levin’s “dime in the phone booth” experiment (Situationism and Virtue Ethics).
The Debate
There’s controversy here—some say Doris overstates the situationist findings and underestimates character, while others argue virtue ethics can adapt to include situational influences. It’s not black and white; both sides have valid points, and it’s a lively debate in philosophy.
There’s controversy here—some say Doris overstates the situationist findings and underestimates character, while others argue virtue ethics can adapt to include situational influences. It’s not black and white; both sides have valid points, and it’s a lively debate in philosophy.
Survey Note: Detailed Analysis of John M. Doris’s Situationist Approach to Morality
This analysis explores John M. Doris’s situationist approach to morality, focusing on its implications for understanding moral behavior and its challenges to traditional virtue ethics. The investigation draws from Doris’s key works, psychological research, and philosophical critiques, considering the empirical basis and ongoing debates. The findings are organized to provide a comprehensive overview, with detailed examples and supporting data, ensuring a thorough understanding for readers interested in moral psychology and ethics.
Background and Core Thesis
John M. Doris, a professor at Cornell University and author of Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (2002) (John M. Doris | Sage School of Philosophy), is a leading proponent of the situationist approach in moral psychology. This approach, rooted in a 70-year tradition of social psychology, challenges the Aristotelian virtue ethics view that moral behavior is primarily driven by stable character traits such as honesty, bravery, or generosity. Instead, situationism posits that behavior is more sensitive to situational factors, such as peer pressure, mood, or environmental cues, than to enduring traits.
Doris’s argument is supported by empirical studies, notably the Milgram experiment, where participants administered what they believed were lethal shocks due to authority pressure, and the Stanford prison experiment, where roles led to abusive behavior (Virtue Ethics and the Situationist Challenge « The Situationist). Another example is Isen and Levin’s “dime in the phone booth” study, where finding a dime increased helping behavior by 84%, illustrating how minor situational changes can significantly affect actions (Situationism and Virtue Ethics - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology).
Doris’s thesis, as detailed in Lack of Character, is that traditional virtue ethics is empirically inadequate, as it cannot account for the variability in moral behavior observed in experimental and naturalistic settings. He argues that character traits are not robust or stable enough to predict behavior consistently, suggesting a “fragmentation theory of character” where dispositions are situation-specific (John Michael Doris, People Like Us: Morality, Psychology, and the Fragmentation of Character - PhilPapers).
Empirical Foundations
The situationist approach draws on a wealth of psychological research, including Hartshorne and May’s 1920s experiments showing children’s cheating varied with opportunity, not character, and Darley and Batson’s Good Samaritan study, where divinity students ignored a person in need if late, highlighting time pressure’s impact (Empirical Approaches to Moral Character (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)). These studies suggest that situational factors, often ethically arbitrary, exert surprising influence, challenging the virtue ethics assumption of cross-situational consistency.
Doris’s work, co-authored with Stephen Stich, further explores this in “Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches” (John Doris's website), emphasizing that effect sizes in personality psychology are small, often requiring statistical magnification, a critique he later acknowledged as applicable to much of psychology, including social psychology (JOHN DORIS — What Is It Like to Be a Philosopher?).
Challenges to Virtue Ethics
Doris’s situationism poses a direct challenge to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which focuses on developing virtuous characters that express traits in all situations. He claims there is “virtually no empirical evidence for the existence of robust character traits in humans,” except in rare cases, based on findings like Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments (Philosophie.ch - The situationist critique of virtue ethics). This critique, shared with Gilbert Harman, suggests that situational factors, such as construal of the situation or peer pressure, are better predictors of behavior than character traits.
The implications are significant: if character is not stable, virtue ethics’s practical aim—moral education and deliberation—may be less effective. Doris argues in Lack of Character that virtue ethics is not practically relevant for most people lacking robust traits, shifting focus to managing situations to improve behavior (Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior | Reviews | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews | University of Notre Dame).
Critiques and Responses
Critics, including virtue ethicists, argue that Doris overplays the data, suggesting character still shows patterns over time. Julia Annas, in “Comments on John Doris’ Lack of Character,” contends that virtues can be understood as developing through habituation, accommodating situational variability (John M. Doris (Washington University in St. Louis) - PhilPeople). Others, like Rachana Kamtekar, propose that early Confucian virtue ethics has strategies for strengthening traits over time, managing situational forces (The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics | Ethics: Vol 121, No 2).
Some critiques focus on methodological issues, noting that situationist experiments often involve artificial settings, like lab conditions, which may not reflect real-world behavior. Surendra Arjoon’s paper, “Reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics,” argues that situationism stems from misunderstandings of moral character, suggesting virtues can adapt to contexts (Reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics, International Journal of Management Reviews | 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2007.00216.x ...). Doris himself acknowledged in an interview that he handled some issues badly, particularly the small effect sizes in psychology, suggesting a need for refinement (JOHN DORIS — What Is It Like to Be a Philosopher?).
Reconciling Situationism and Virtue Ethics
Efforts to reconcile both perspectives suggest that character and situation are not mutually exclusive. Ian Tully’s essay, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics,” notes that virtues might be expressed differently across situations, with concessions allowing debate to focus on how behavior changes with context (Situationism and Virtue Ethics - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology). Papers like “Pitting Virtue Ethics Against Situationism: An Empirical Argument for Virtue” argue for empirical simplifications, suggesting virtuous behavior may adapt to situational changes (Pitting Virtue Ethics Against Situationism: An Empirical Argument for Virtue | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice).
This reconciliation aligns with the idea that character traits are probabilistic, predicting average behavior over time, not specific acts. For instance, an honest person is more likely to act honestly, but a high-pressure situation might override this, as seen in the Good Samaritan study.
Practical Implications
If situationism is correct, improving moral behavior requires designing better situations, such as implementing oversight in organizations to reduce dishonesty or creating environments that encourage helping, like clear signage for emergencies. However, if character matters, moral education and habituation remain crucial, suggesting a dual approach. This is particularly relevant in 2025, with remote work and digital platforms amplifying situational influences, as seen in discussions on workplace ethics curricula incorporating situationist insights (The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics and Its Implications for the Media Ethics Classroom: Journal of Media Ethics: Vol 35, No 3).
Comparative Analysis and Conclusion
Compared to other moral theories, situationism’s focus on context contrasts with utilitarianism’s outcomes or Kantianism’s rules, offering a practical lens for policy design. However, its dismissal of character risks excusing accountability, a concern raised in critiques. The analysis, conducted as of March 31, 2025, ensures relevance, drawing from historical and recent evidence to inform moral psychology debates.
Table: Summary of Key Studies Supporting Situationism
Study | Description | Key Finding |
|---|---|---|
Milgram Experiment | Participants administered shocks under authority pressure | Obedience to situation overrode moral character |
Stanford Prison Experiment | Roles led to abusive behavior | Situational roles shaped actions, not traits |
Dime in Phone Booth (Isen & Levin, 1972) | Finding a dime increased helping behavior by 84% | Minor situational change significantly impacted behavior |
Good Samaritan (Darley & Batson) | Divinity students ignored need if late | Time pressure trumped compassion |
This table highlights the empirical basis, comparing study designs and findings, with ongoing debates reflecting current philosophical challenges.
Key Citations
